Throughout this century, the United States, as a nation, has anguished over the plight of American prisoners of war, both known and missing. The emotional ordeal of the families, the debt which the nation owes to those who have put their lives on the line for their countries, and the human dignity of each and every single soldier, or sailor, or airman ought to have an incalculable bearing on our national policies and our honor.

On the record, the U.S. government has professed to give these concerns "the highest national priority." Off the record, this priority vanishes. Instead, other considerations emerge: Grand visions of a foreign policy of peace and reconciliation; desire for a new economic order of trade and investment; ideological imperatives to down play the hositility of antagonistic systems; and the natural tendency of the bureaucracy to eliminate its workload by filing cases marked "closed" instead of finding the people.

Last October, the Minority Staff published an Interim Report based on hundreds of interviews and reviews of raw intelligence data in DOD files. The Interim Report suggested that DOD was more interested in manipulating and managing the issue than in finding living POWs listed as missing. But as the investigation proceeded, the weight of evidence of failure--a failure of the U.S. Government to meet its sacred trust--became overpowering.

Was it really possible that officials in the Executive Branch charged with the solution of POW/MIA issues could have failed so miserably to respond to the needs of the American people? Was it simply that theemotions of the POW/MIA-concerned community were making objective appraisal of DOD's work impossible?

The resignation of the director of DOD Special Office for POW/MIA Matters, Col. Millard A. Peck, submitted on February 12, but made public only last month, offered unexpected and extraordinary support for the findings of the Interim Report. (Col. Peck's resignation will be treated in detail later in this report.) But the question remained: Was it credible that such a failure could occur? To answer that question, it was necessary to turn to history.

The Gulf War is not yet history, but the brief span of fighting provided several examples of the inability of the U.S. Government to cope with the problems of accounting for the missing--examples which are still fresh from the newspapers.

Inaccurate battle casualty reporting resulted in the next-of-kin of Daniel J. Stomaris and Troy A. Dunlap being officially notified by DOD that the soldiers had been Killed in Action (KIA); in fact, these men were slightly wounded or taken prisoner by the enemy. Several other soldiers- Major Rhonda Wetzel, for example--were taken prisoner by the enemy but were not listed as POW or MIA or KIA; their subsequent relealse by the Iraqis came as a surprise to the American public and the national media.

But the most bizarre case was that of SPC Melissa Rathbun-Nealy. SPC Rathbun-Nealy and SPC David Lockett were co-drivers of a HET (Heavy Equipment Transport), captured by Iraqi soldiers after their HET and another one became separated from a convoy. As the two vehicles proceeded north, they came under enemy fire. The second vehicle managed to escape, but Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett were surrounded and captured.

After her capture by Iraqi forces, Rathbun-Nealy's duty status was initially listed as "unknown," then changed to "missing." However, she was never listed as "missing in action" (MIA) or "prisoner of war" (POW). It should be noted that "missing," under U.S. Army regulations, is quite distinct from MIA. "Missing" is reserved from personnel unaccounted for in non-combat operations. From the Army's point of view, the convoy was a non-combat operation, even though it was under heavy enemy fire. Therefore, Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett were never listed as MIA or POW, even though the Army had information that they had been captured under fire. This distinction is an important illustration of how DOD uses technical distinctions to avoid a finding of POW/MIA.

In a letter to Mr. and Mrs. Leo Rathbun, Lt. Colonel J.G. Cole, Chief POW/MIA Affairs, demonstrates how DOD, even in real-time cases, fails to follow up obvious leads or to ask obvious questions. In the narrative that follows, it should be kept in mind that Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett must have been an astonishing pair of prisoners to the Iraqi mindset because Rathbun- Nealy is a white Caucasian female, and Lockett is an African-American male. Since Major Wetzel was the only other U.S. female prisoner, it should not have been hard in Iraq to seek out a pair of prisoners fitting the description of a white female and a black male.

Colonel Cole wrote:

At approximately 3pm, (January 30, 1991) just north of Khafji, the convoy drove by a Saudi M-60 tank that had recently received extensive battle damage and was partially blocking the road. The occupants of the second HET then heard two explosions and the sound of debris striking their vehicle, observed what they perceived to be enemy troops ahead near the archway into town, and immediately initiated a U-turn along the road. At this time they estimated that they were 100-150 meters behind the lead vehicle, which was continuing north. After completing the turn, the crew looked back and saw tha the other HET [driven by Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett] had tried to turn about, but had become stuck. Melissa and SPC Lockett were observed to be still in their vehicle as the enemy troops approached. There was no indication that they attempted to return fire or flee.

Last seen being surrounded by enemy troops, Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett were listed as "missing." But DOD had more information as well. Colonel Cole wrote further:

There were no signs of fighting or blood, but personal gear had been scattered around the area, and weapons were missing. As the Marines were searching around the vehicle shouting for the soldiers, they were confronted by several Iraqi foot soldiers at the HET and an armored personnel carrier approximately 50 meters north, headed in their direction. No shots were exchanged by the Marines who departed the area and called in attack helicopter support which destroyed the APC within 30 meters of the HET....The Marines returned to the area the following morning where they collected some of the personal equipment and found the vehicle running but found no trace of Melissa or SPC Lockett... During the battle in and around Khafji several Iraqi soldiers were captured.

One would assume that the capture of Iraqi soldiers in the area would have given the opportunity to find out positively whether or not the pair had been captured. And indeed the Iraqi soldiers gave such information:

Following interrogation of the enemy prisoners of war by Saudi forces, two reports were received. One concerned information provided by an Iraqi lieutenant who said he had witnessed the capture of an American male and female. He further stated that both had been injured and that the white female had sustained an injury to her arm. The second report received from Saudi forces concerned two other Iraqi prisoners of war from a captured patrol who indicated they had seen a white female and a black male near the city of Bashrah, Kuwait [not far from the site of the abandoned HET].

To the lay observer, this sounds like a good "live-sighting" report, based on circumstances that almost exactly dovetail with the circumstances of the missing soldiers. But when Mr. Leo Rathbun asked Colonel Cole why his daughter was not listed as MIA, Cole replied that the Iraqi officer could not make "a positive identification"--as though there were hundreds of pairs of white female and black male soldiers captured in the area.

Colonel Cole explained further that the U.S. interrogators had no current picture of SPC Rathbun-Nealy to show the Iraqi officer (although of course her picture was appearing in every newspaper in the Western world.) Had they thought of it, no doubt DOD would have demanded that the Iraqi witnesses produce the fingerprints of the captured pair before accepting the live-sighting report as genuine.

Because there was no "positive identification" Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett could not be listed as POW/MIA. Had there been an extended war and extended negotiations to secure the return of prisoners, the name of neither one would have appeared on any list of POW/MIAs being sought. They were listed only as "missing," that is, unaccounted for but not known to be in enemy hands. Had a difficult negotiation been required to secure a return of listed POW/MIAs, Iraq need never have returned Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett because they were not on the list. Fortunately, the war was so brief and so powerful that all prisoners were returned without question.

The case of SPC Rathbun-Nealy and SPC Lockett is a vivid illustration to keep in mind when considering the bureaucratic mindset that refuses to go outside of artificial restrictions in order to find real people. If the case had been prolonged, if the report had come months or even years later, if the vivid memories of the event had gathered dust in DOD files, the same facts would have been true.

The war that Americans call the Vietnam War is really, from the standpoint of history, the Second Indochina War. The French have the dubious distinction of having fought the First Indochina War--a most important fact to know in order to understand that the Communist Vietnamese act out of an acquired experience of warfare with Western countries. Moreover, the Vietnamese, as Communists, have had the additional benefit of the experience of other Communist regimes in dealing with the United States and European powers. Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that the problems which the United States has had in dealing with prisoners of war and the missing in action are not the result of chance, but of historic Communist policy.

Indeed, history reveals that policy. In the years after World War I and II, the Soviet regime, and later their North Korean cohorts, held American soldiers and citizens captive in the aftermath of these wars. A 1954 New York Times article gives some insight into Communist attitudes towards POWs. In January, 1954, three Americans, two held by the Soviets and one by the Chinese Communists, were repatriated. The New York Times reported:

All three confirm that the Soviet bloc and the Chinese Communists are holding in their jails and slave camps many oreigners, including soldiers, and civilians, women and children...according to State Department figures, the total number of Americans held by the Soviets and their European satellites exceeds 5,000...Many of these Americans, like many Europeans, were residents in the iron curtain countries caught by the Communist tide; others were deported from German war prisoner camps; some, like Cox were simply kidnapped! [1]

The fact is that Soviet and Asian Communist regimes view POW/MIAs, living or dead, not as a problem of humanitarian concern but as leverage for political bargaining, as an involuntary source of technical assistance, and as forced labor. There is, therefore, no compelling reason in Communist logic to return POWs, or their remains, so long as political and economic goals have not been met. The logic of the Vietnamese position requires them to conceal, to dissimulate, to titillate, and to dole out actual information grudgingly, piece by piece, but always in return for very practical results.

This perverse thinking is shocking to Americans who are straightforward and honest in interpersonal dealings. Yet we should instead be surprised if this were not the case. Indeed, the policy began with Lenin. From the Time of the Bolshevik treatment of POWs from the American Expeditionary Force in World War I, to the Soviet Treatment of POWs in World War II, to the North Korean actions in the Korean War, and finally in the First and Second Indochina Wars--POWs including MIAs, were used by Communist regimes as cynical bargaining tools in contravention of international law.

-------- [1] "The Other Russians," The New York Times, January 5, 1954

In 1973, the Vietnamese used POWs in an attempt to blackmail the United States into providing nearly $5 billion in so-called "reparations." Both the United States and Vietnam asserted in that year that "OPERATION HOMECOMING" was bringing home all known prisoners. The Vietnamese believed that they had a deal--a dirty deal, to be sure, in which prisoners would be exchanged for cold cash. It was a deal brokered by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger via a secret hand-carried letter. It would be perfectly consistent with the historical Communist policy to hold back prisoners against their will, and even the remains of the dead, to exchange for dollars at a later date. The evidence of this investigation, therefore, must be weighed against the probabilities of the historical background.

Most of this information is not well-known by the American public; however, all of it is based on open-source material, including offical U.S. Government documents that have been declassified and collected from official agencies through Freedom of Information Act requests and through research from the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

U.S. problems in accounting for POW/MIAs did not suddenly emerge in the Second Indochina War; in fact, the basic Communist tactics were already evident at the birth of the Soviet Union in the Bolshevik Revolution.

Today, most Americans have forgotten that there were two main fronts during World War I--the Western Front, which was the center of Allied attention, and which today still receives the most focus; and the Eastern Front, which occurred when the Bolshevik Regime signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans and withdrew Russian forces from participation with the Allies. Thereupon, the Allies grew apprehensive about the German threat to the ports of Murmansk and Archangel, and sent the Allied Expeditionary Force to Siberia to protect the rear.

As a result of the fighting against Soviet Bolshevik forces around Archangel in 1918-1919, there were many casualties, and eyewitness accounts of hundreds of U.S. and British and French personnel who disappeared. Nevertheless, official cables from the U.S. military attache at Archangel cited much lower numbers than the eyewitness reports of missing personnel. The U.S. government policy concerning these and others in the two categories of missing in action (MIA) and killed in action, body not recovered (KIA-BNR) from the American Expeditionary Force in Russia, as detailed in a November, 1930 memorandum from the U.S. Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, stated the following:

An administrative determination has been placed on each of their records. that they were killed in action on the date they were reported missing. [1]

In other words, all of the men who were MIA were determined to be KIA- BNR on the date they were reported missing.